arma_3:antistasi_commanders_guide:introduction_to_asymmetrical_warfare
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| arma_3:antistasi_commanders_guide:introduction_to_asymmetrical_warfare [2026/01/04 06:44] – ↷ Links adapted because of a move operation dragonfly | arma_3:antistasi_commanders_guide:introduction_to_asymmetrical_warfare [2026/09/09 01:05] (current) – Formatting fix genchadt | ||
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| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
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| **Battle Quotes**\\ | **Battle Quotes**\\ | ||
| - | “The war was one of dervishes against aeroplanes…\\ | + | “The war was one of dervishes against aeroplanes…\\ |
| - | Ours should be a war of detachment: | + | |
| - | We were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert,\\ | + | |
| - | not disclosing ourselves till we attacked.”\\ | + | |
| — T. E. Lawrence | — T. E. Lawrence | ||
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| </ | </ | ||
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| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
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| **Battle Quotes**\\ | **Battle Quotes**\\ | ||
| “In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home.”\\ | “In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home.”\\ | ||
| - | + | ||
| — B. H. Liddell Hart | — B. H. Liddell Hart | ||
| + | |||
| </ | </ | ||
| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
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| **Battle Quotes**\\ | **Battle Quotes**\\ | ||
| - | All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable;\\ | + | All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; |
| - | when using our forces, we must appear inactive;\\ | + | |
| - | when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away.\\ | + | |
| — Sun Tzu | — Sun Tzu | ||
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| </ | </ | ||
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| === (1) Asymmetric Warfare === | === (1) Asymmetric Warfare === | ||
| - | A state of conflict between belligerents whose relative military power, strategies, and tactics differ significantly. The objective is to leverage one's own strengths against an adversary' | + | |
| + | //A state of conflict between belligerents whose relative military power, strategies, and tactics differ significantly. The objective is to leverage one's own strengths against an adversary' | ||
| === (2) The Conventional Adversary (Threat) === | === (2) The Conventional Adversary (Threat) === | ||
| - | A technologically advanced, hierarchically structured military force. | + | |
| + | //A technologically advanced, hierarchically structured military force.// | ||
| == (a) Strengths == | == (a) Strengths == | ||
| + | |||
| //Superior firepower, air superiority, | //Superior firepower, air superiority, | ||
| - | == (b) Weaknesses == | + | == (b) Weaknesses == |
| //Doctrinal rigidity, predictable patrol patterns, dependence on secure supply lines, low tolerance for casualties, political vulnerability.// | //Doctrinal rigidity, predictable patrol patterns, dependence on secure supply lines, low tolerance for casualties, political vulnerability.// | ||
| <WRAP 25% right> | <WRAP 25% right> | ||
| + | |||
| {{..: | {{..: | ||
| + | |||
| </ | </ | ||
| === (3) The Irregular Force (Friendly) === | === (3) The Irregular Force (Friendly) === | ||
| - | A flexible, decentralized force operating with limited resources. | + | |
| + | //A flexible, decentralized force operating with limited resources.// | ||
| == (a) Strengths == | == (a) Strengths == | ||
| + | |||
| //Superior knowledge of the local terrain, operational flexibility, | //Superior knowledge of the local terrain, operational flexibility, | ||
| == (b) Weaknesses == | == (b) Weaknesses == | ||
| + | |||
| //Lack of heavy firepower, fragile logistics, limited manpower, inability to win decisive, conventional engagements.// | //Lack of heavy firepower, fragile logistics, limited manpower, inability to win decisive, conventional engagements.// | ||
| Line 79: | Line 89: | ||
| ==== a. The Five Pillars of Asymmetric Operations ==== | ==== a. The Five Pillars of Asymmetric Operations ==== | ||
| - | === (1) Control the Tempo. === | + | === (1) Control the Tempo. === |
| You, not the enemy, will decide the time and place of every engagement. The initiative is your most valuable asset. | You, not the enemy, will decide the time and place of every engagement. The initiative is your most valuable asset. | ||
| == (a) VIOLENCE OF ACTION == | == (a) VIOLENCE OF ACTION == | ||
| + | |||
| **All offensive actions will be SUDDEN, VIOLENT, and BRIEF.** All offensive actions must be prosecuted with overwhelming local superiority, | **All offensive actions will be SUDDEN, VIOLENT, and BRIEF.** All offensive actions must be prosecuted with overwhelming local superiority, | ||
| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
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| **Battle Quotes**\\ | **Battle Quotes**\\ | ||
| Line 91: | Line 104: | ||
| — Gen. George S. Patton | — Gen. George S. Patton | ||
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| </ | </ | ||
| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
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| **Battle Quotes**\\ | **Battle Quotes**\\ | ||
| Line 99: | Line 114: | ||
| — General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. | — General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. | ||
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| </ | </ | ||
| == (b) TACTICAL DISENGAGEMENT == | == (b) TACTICAL DISENGAGEMENT == | ||
| + | |||
| **The Withdrawal: Deliberate and Decisive.** Strike and exfiltrate before the enemy brings superior firepower to bear. Prolonged combat is to be avoided at all costs, as it allows the adversary to leverage their primary strengths: numerical superiority and heavy fire support (QRF, artillery, air assets). Therefore, every operation must include a planned and rehearsed withdrawal. You will strike the target, accomplish the immediate objective, and exfiltrate before the enemy can effectively counter. Disengagement is not failure; it is a tactical imperative that preserves combat power. | **The Withdrawal: Deliberate and Decisive.** Strike and exfiltrate before the enemy brings superior firepower to bear. Prolonged combat is to be avoided at all costs, as it allows the adversary to leverage their primary strengths: numerical superiority and heavy fire support (QRF, artillery, air assets). Therefore, every operation must include a planned and rehearsed withdrawal. You will strike the target, accomplish the immediate objective, and exfiltrate before the enemy can effectively counter. Disengagement is not failure; it is a tactical imperative that preserves combat power. | ||
| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
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| **Battle Quotes**\\ | **Battle Quotes**\\ | ||
| - | " | + | " |
| - | One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant." | + | |
| — Sun Tzu | — Sun Tzu | ||
| + | |||
| </ | </ | ||
| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
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| **Battle Quotes**\\ | **Battle Quotes**\\ | ||
| Line 119: | Line 138: | ||
| — B. H. Liddell Hart | — B. H. Liddell Hart | ||
| + | |||
| </ | </ | ||
| - | == (c) PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENCE== | + | == (c) PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENCE == |
| **The Effect: Induce Exhaustion and Uncertainty.** By consistently initiating contact on our terms and then disappearing, | **The Effect: Induce Exhaustion and Uncertainty.** By consistently initiating contact on our terms and then disappearing, | ||
| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
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| **Battle Quotes**\\ | **Battle Quotes**\\ | ||
| Line 130: | Line 152: | ||
| — Napoleon Bonaparte | — Napoleon Bonaparte | ||
| + | |||
| </ | </ | ||
| === (2) Exploit Enemy Weakness. === | === (2) Exploit Enemy Weakness. === | ||
| + | |||
| **Do not attack enemy strongpoints. Attack their vulnerabilities. Their strength is their weakness.** | **Do not attack enemy strongpoints. Attack their vulnerabilities. Their strength is their weakness.** | ||
| - | | + | |
| - | - Their **Predictability** is a vulnerability. Observe enemy patterns—patrol routes, shift changes, reaction times—and exploit them without mercy. | + | |
| - | - Their **Command Structure** is centralized. Identify and eliminate enemy leaders and command posts to sow chaos and paralyze their response. | + | - Their **Predictability** is a vulnerability. Observe enemy patterns—patrol routes, shift changes, reaction times—and exploit them without mercy. |
| + | - Their **Command Structure** is centralized. Identify and eliminate enemy leaders and command posts to sow chaos and paralyze their response. | ||
| < | < | ||
| Line 147: | Line 172: | ||
| </ | </ | ||
| - | === (3) Weaponize the Environment. === | + | === (3) Weaponize the Environment. === |
| **Your primary weapon is not your rifle; it is your intimate knowledge of the Area of Operations.** | **Your primary weapon is not your rifle; it is your intimate knowledge of the Area of Operations.** | ||
| - | | + | |
| - | - Time is a weapon. Attack during periods of low visibility—night, | + | |
| - | - The local populace is part of the operational environment. Their perception of you dictates the intelligence and support you will receive. | + | - Time is a weapon. Attack during periods of low visibility—night, |
| + | - The local populace is part of the operational environment. Their perception of you dictates the intelligence and support you will receive. | ||
| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
| + | |||
| **Battle Quotes**\\ | **Battle Quotes**\\ | ||
| “The natural formation of the country is the soldier' | “The natural formation of the country is the soldier' | ||
| - | + | ||
| — Sun Tzu | — Sun Tzu | ||
| + | |||
| </ | </ | ||
| === (4) Achieve Popular Support. === | === (4) Achieve Popular Support. === | ||
| + | |||
| **The population is the sea in which we swim. Without their support, we are isolated and will be destroyed.** | **The population is the sea in which we swim. Without their support, we are isolated and will be destroyed.** | ||
| - | | + | |
| - | - Provide security and aid to the local populace where possible. One’s legitimacy is built one positive action at a time. | + | |
| - | - The populace is a primary source of intelligence. Earn their trust and one gains a thousand eyes and ears across the AO. | + | - Provide security and aid to the local populace where possible. One’s legitimacy is built one positive action at a time. |
| + | - The populace is a primary source of intelligence. Earn their trust and one gains a thousand eyes and ears across the AO. | ||
| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
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| **Battle Quotes**\\ | **Battle Quotes**\\ | ||
| Line 173: | Line 205: | ||
| — Mao Zedong | — Mao Zedong | ||
| + | |||
| </ | </ | ||
| <WRAP INFO> | <WRAP INFO> | ||
| - | **Insurgent Commander' | + | |
| - | The best way to win the " | + | **Insurgent Commander' |
| </ | </ | ||
| === (5) Attack the Enemy' | === (5) Attack the Enemy' | ||
| + | |||
| **Our strategic objective is psychological, | **Our strategic objective is psychological, | ||
| - | | + | |
| - | - Create a persistent, high-threat environment. The enemy must feel unsafe everywhere, at all times. Constant pressure erodes morale. | + | |
| - | - The goal is to make the political cost of the occupation unacceptable to the enemy' | + | - Create a persistent, high-threat environment. The enemy must feel unsafe everywhere, at all times. Constant pressure erodes morale. |
| + | - The goal is to make the political cost of the occupation unacceptable to the enemy' | ||
| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
| - | **Battle Quotes**\\ | + | |
| - | “The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men.”\\ | + | **Battle Quotes**\\ |
| — B. H. Liddell Hart | — B. H. Liddell Hart | ||
| + | |||
| </ | </ | ||
| <WRAP INFO> | <WRAP INFO> | ||
| - | **Insurgent Commander' | + | |
| - | The irregular fighter' | + | **Insurgent Commander' |
| </ | </ | ||
| Line 207: | Line 245: | ||
| === (1) A Raid === | === (1) A Raid === | ||
| + | |||
| An operation to temporarily seize an objective for a specific purpose (e.g., capture supplies, destroy equipment, assassinate a leader) followed by a planned withdrawal. | An operation to temporarily seize an objective for a specific purpose (e.g., capture supplies, destroy equipment, assassinate a leader) followed by a planned withdrawal. | ||
| - | | + | |
| + | | ||
| === (2) An Ambush === | === (2) An Ambush === | ||
| + | |||
| A surprise attack from a concealed position on a moving or temporarily halted target. | A surprise attack from a concealed position on a moving or temporarily halted target. | ||
| - | | + | |
| + | | ||
| === (3) Sabotage === | === (3) Sabotage === | ||
| + | |||
| Involves the destruction of enemy infrastructure, | Involves the destruction of enemy infrastructure, | ||
| - | | + | |
| + | | ||
| ==== b. Defensive Actions ==== | ==== b. Defensive Actions ==== | ||
| Line 223: | Line 267: | ||
| === (1) Our defense === | === (1) Our defense === | ||
| + | |||
| is active and mobile. If attacked by a superior force, you will delay, disrupt, and disengage on your own terms. | is active and mobile. If attacked by a superior force, you will delay, disrupt, and disengage on your own terms. | ||
| === (2) Fortified positions === | === (2) Fortified positions === | ||
| + | |||
| are only to be held when they offer an overwhelming tactical advantage. They are tools, not homes. | are only to be held when they offer an overwhelming tactical advantage. They are tools, not homes. | ||
| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
| - | **Battle Quotes**\\ \\ | + | |
| - | “I am a fox. I am not a lion. I do not have a den.”\\ \\ | + | **Battle Quotes**\\ \\ “I am a fox. I am not a lion. I do not have a den.”\\ \\ |
| — Omar Mukhtar | — Omar Mukhtar | ||
| + | |||
| </ | </ | ||
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| <WRAP BOX> | <WRAP BOX> | ||
| - | **Battle Quotes**\\ \\ | + | |
| - | “Guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of the people. By organizing and mobilizing the people, we can create a vast sea of humanity and drown any enemy in it.”\\ \\ | + | **Battle Quotes**\\ \\ “Guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of the people. By organizing and mobilizing the people, we can create a vast sea of humanity and drown any enemy in it.”\\ \\ |
| — Võ Nguyên Giáp | — Võ Nguyên Giáp | ||
| + | |||
| </ | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | |||
arma_3/antistasi_commanders_guide/introduction_to_asymmetrical_warfare.1767509076.txt.gz · Last modified: by dragonfly